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Abstract: This paper demonstrates eigenanalysis to quantitatively reveal the diversity and 
capacity of identities offered by the morphological diversity in silicon nanostructures 
formed via random collapse of resist. The analysis suggests that approximately 10115 
possible identities are provided per 0.18-m2 area of nanostructures, indicating that 
nanoscale morphological signatures will be extremely useful for future information security 
applications where securing identities is critical. The eigenanalysis provides an intuitive 
physical picture and quantitative characterization of the diversity of structural fluctuations 
while unifying measurement stability concerns, which will be widely applicable to other 
materials, devices, and system architectures.  
 
1. Introduction 
Artifact metrics [1], also called physical unclonable functions (PUF) [2], utilize the unique 
physical properties of individual objects for authentication and clone resistance purposes in 
information security applications. These include electromagnetic [3], mechanical, and optical 
properties [4] associated with the objects such as ordinary paper [5], paper containing magnetic 
microfibers [6], plastics, and semiconductor chips. Matsumoto et al. demonstrates nano-artifact 
metrics that exploits physically uncontrollable processes occurring at the nanometer-scale, which 
are well beyond the scope of nanostructure technologies, in order to protect against increasing 
security attacks [7]. Versatile, nanoscale morphological patterns formed on the surfaces of planar 
silicon devices are one of the most unique and useful vehicles for nano-artifact metrics. This 
study investigates morphological diversity in silicon random nanostructures based on the 
eigenanalysis approach.  
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In particular, we utilize the random collapse of resists induced by exposure to electron-
beam (e-beam) lithography [7]. Resist collapse may occur during the rinse process of 
lithography, and depends on the pattern resolution, resist thickness, and duration of e-beam 
exposure [8]. The result is the collapse of the intended pattern and production of versatile 
morphological patterns with minimum dimensions smaller than the resolutions of 
nanofabrication technologies [7]. The basic performance for security applications was clarified in 
Ref. [7] by quantitatively evaluating the false-match rate (FMR) for verifying identities, the false 
non-match rate (FNMR) for characterizing the stability of measurements, and the clone-match 
rate for evaluating the difficulties in making clones.  
However, the technology’s potential is not completely known yet, especially in terms of the 
number of different devices or identities that could be distinguished based on the nanoscale 
morphological patterns. This is especially important in view of future applications such as 
document security [9] and Internet-of-Things (IoT) [10], where securing identities of massive 
number of devices is critical. In this study, we demonstrate eigenanalysis of experimentally 
fabricated silicon random nanostructures, through which the diversity and the potential capacity 
of identities are quantitatively characterized. Our eigenspace-based approach provides intuitive 
physical pictures and quantitative discussions regarding the morphological diversity of 
nanostructured devices while uniting measurement stability, which is one of the important 
concerns for security applications.  
2. Experimental devices 
First, we review the experimental random nanostructured devices analyzed in this study. We 
fabricated an array of resist pillars with a 60 nm  60 nm  200 nm cross-sectional area on a grid 
of 120 nm  120 nm squares that filled a 2 m  2 m square, as shown in figure 1(a). We used 
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an e-beam lithography system (JEOL JBX-9300FS) with a 100-kV acceleration voltage. In the 
rinse process, the random collapse of resist pillars was induced as shown in the scanning electron 
microscope (SEM) image in figure 1(b); versatile morphological patterns or structural 
fluctuations were observed. The resulting patterns were imaged by a critical-dimension SEM 
(CD-SEM, Hitachi High-Technologies CG4000). We analyzed 2383 samples fabricated on a 
single 200-mm–diameter wafer. Figures 1(c) and (d) show examples of SEM images of an array 
of collapsed resist pillars. The image contains 1024  1024 pixels and has an 8-bit resolution 
(256 levels). Versatile morphologies were observed, and the structural detail of the patterns 
(figure 1(c)) is as small as 9.23 nm [7].  
3. Results and discussions 
We examine experimentally observed structural diversity based on the following eigenspace-
based principle. An 8-bit (256 levels) greyscale image of size 128  128 pixels was extracted 
from around the center of a pillar array image and smoothed using an 11  11 median filter. 
Here, one pixel occupies an area of approximately 3.3 nm side-length; therefore, the area of a 
single image is about 0.18 m2. We denote an image by a vector ix , which has P = 128  128 
elements. All the images or the total sets of devices are summarized by a matrix 
1 2{ , , , }NZ  x x x ,                                                                                           (1) 
where N  is the number of devices, which is 2383 in the present study. Let the mean values of all 
images be given by 
1
1 N
i
iN 
 μ x .                                                                                                        (2) 
The covariance matrix is given by 
1 ( ) ( )TC Z Z
N
  μ μ ,                                                                                       (3) 
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where T indicates the matrix transpose and ( )Z  μ  implies subtracting the vector μ  from each 
column of matrix Z. By solving the eigenequation  
k k kC s s ,                                                                                                         (4) 
we derive the eigenvalues k  and the eigenvectors ks . We set the index k  so that the 
eigenvalues are arranged in descending order. Such an eigendecomposition approach in 
analyzing a cluster of images is widely used in image processing literature [11] as well as in 
other high-dimensional systems such as robotic manipulators [12] and alignment of optical 
systems [13]. 
Figure 2(a) shows the cumulative sum of the eigenvalues divided by their sum. From this 
evaluation, 98% of the original images cannot be retrieved if we do not consider eigenvectors up 
to the 424th order, indicating that the morphological fluctuation of the devices under study spans 
a vast volume of high-dimensional eigenspaces (inset of figure 2(a)). Figure 2(b) shows the 
eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues [from the 1st to the 10th], [from the 30th to the 
39th], and [from the 400th to the 409th], each represented by a two-dimensional image. The 
eigenvectors with eigenvalues around the 400th order contain single-pixel-level resolution and 
fine-scale structures. From these observations, we can clearly grasp the physical versatility of 
silicon random structures by means of eigenanalysis. Furthermore, our interest is to 
quantitatively reveal the potential and the limitations of such morphological diversity. 
Each image or device ix  is rewritten in the form of a linear combination of eigenvectors; 
( )i i k k
k
 x x s s . The projection of ix  to an eigenvector ks  is denoted by 
( )i
k i kX  x s  ,                                                                                                   (5) 
meaning that ( ) ( ) ( )1( , , )
i i i
PX XX   represents ix  in the eigenspace.  
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Here, an identical device can be observed in a slightly different manner depending on the 
observation conditions, which are affected by the misalignment or other reasons. Such 
fluctuations in measurements should be tolerated in order to ensure measurement stability, which 
is an important concern in view of security applications [7]. We quantify these fluctuations in 
measurements in the eigenspace as follows. Multiple measurements were performed for each of 
the 67 types of devices. Each measurement, for a certain identical device is denoted by im  
( 1, , )i K  , where K is the number of measurements. The measurement im  is represented in 
the eigenspace by  
( )i
k i kM  m s .                                                                                                        (6) 
The measurement im  is represented in the eigenspace by ( ) ( ) ( )1( , , )
i i i
PM MM  . Meanwhile, the 
N types of individual device ix  ( 1, , )i N   are represented in the eigenspace by equation (5). 
The similarity between ( )iM  and ( )jX  is characterized by the inner product given by  
( ) ( )
1
ij
L
L i j
k k
k
R M X

  ,                                                                                                  (7) 
which should be maximum when j  is the designated identity that ( )iM  belongs to. In equation 
(7), L denotes the number of eigenvectors considered while evaluating similarity. If L is too 
small, similarity does not provide an accurate classification; we quantify the minimum 
dimensions in identifying individual devices without errors. The ratio of inadequate classification 
or equivalent FNMR is evaluated for all 67 devices as a function of the dimension (L). Figure 
3(a) shows six representative cases; the circular marks indicate that L should be larger than 15 to 
suppress the error rate to zero. Concerning all devices, the error rate results in zero, if L is larger 
than 38.  
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Furthermore, we consider the system’s capacity. Let a measurement im  ( 1, , )i K   or 
equivalently its eigenspace representation ( )iM  belong to the identity j represented by jx  or 
( )jX  in the eigenspace. The deviation of im  around the identity jx  is characterized in the 
eigenspace by  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
ˆ ˆ
L
i i j j
k k
k
M X

   M X ,                                                                                      (8) 
which represents the deviation of ( )iM  from the projected vector of ( )iM  on to ( )ˆ jX , as 
schematically shown in figure 3(b). Here, ( )ˆ jX  is the normalized vector of ( )jX . By calculating 
the deviation vector given by equation (8) for all measurements 1, ,i K  , we derive a vector 
representing the mean value of all measurements, denoted by 1 2( , , , )Ps s sS  , which 
characterizes the extent to which individual devices should span in the eigenspace while 
tolerating the measurement stability. Considering that the first L (= 38) eigenvectors are 
necessary to satisfy the measurement stability, the volume spanned by S  is characterized by the 
multiplication of the first L elements 1 2
1
L
k L
k
s s s s

      [12]. Taking the ensemble average 
over 67 devices, 
1
L
k
k
s

 is estimated to about 8.11 × 1075. 
Meanwhile, the volume of the eigenspace spanned by different types of devices is 
characterized by the multiplication of the eigenvalues 1 2
1
L
k L
k
   

      [12], which is 
approximately 7.29 × 10190 in the present study. Such a metric is also known to be useful in 
characterizing the manipulability of robots [12]. By dividing this amount by the individual 
device’s volume, as schematically shown in figure 3(c), the capacity or the number of potential 
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identities is derived by 
1 1
L L
k k
k k
s
 
  , which is estimated at approximately 10115 or 
equivalently approximately 380 bits. This amount is significantly large, achieved by a 0.18-m2 
device indicating the huge capacity of the morphological patterns of silicon nanostructures 
formed via resist collapse. In other words, the eigenspace-based insight into structural diversity 
observed in silicon structures while unifying measurement tolerances provides an intuitive 
physical picture as well as quantitative estimations of their potential performances.  
4. Conclusion 
In summary, we demonstrate the eigenanalysis of morphological fluctuations in silicon 
nanostructures formed via resist collapse in order to clarify its potential for nano-artifact metrics 
or PUF. The result shows that the nanoscale morphological patterns are widely distributed in a 
hugely high-dimensional eigenspace; 424th order eigenvectors are needed to reconstruct 98% of 
the original nanostructured patterns in our particular experiment. Considering measurement 
stability in the eigenspace, the estimated number of implementable different identities is 
approximately 10115 in a 0.18-m2 nanostructure area, indicating the usefulness of nanoscale 
devices to accommodate huge amounts of uniqueness for future security applications. The 
presented approach provides an intuitive physical picture regarding the diversity of structural 
fluctuations and its systematic and quantitative characterizations, which will be widely 
applicable to other materials, devices, and system architectures.  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. (a,b) The design of a resist pillars array, (a) which is collapsed randomly during the 
rinse process of e-beam lithography as observed in a SEM image shown in (b). (c,d) SEM 
images of the fabricated devices (total number: 2383) exhibiting versatile morphologies 
due to the random collapse. The minimum dimension is occasionally <10 nm, (c) which 
is considered extremely difficult to fabricate clones. Such versatilities, derived by 
physical randomness occurring in dimensions beyond the expected technology roadmap, 
are the fundamental ideas of nano-artifact metrics or PUF [7] (adapted by permission 
from Macmillan Publishers Ltd: Scientific Reports [7], Copyright 2014). 
 
Figure 2. Eigenanalysis of the fabricated devices. (a) Cumulative sum of the eigenvalues divided 
by their sum as a function of the eigenvalues’ number. In retrieving 98% of the individual 
images, 424 eigenvectors are required, indicating that the fabricated morphological 
patterns span in a high dimensions in the eigenspace. (b) Examples of two-dimensional 
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representations of the eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues [from the 1st to the 
10th], [from the 30th to the 39th], and [from the 400th to the 409th].  
 
Figure 3. (a) Eigenanalysis of the measurement stability: Multiple measurements for an identical 
device should yield the same device identification. When the number of eigenvectors 
considered during identification decreases, the identification error, referred to as the false 
no-match rate (FNMR), increases. When more than 38 eigenvectors are considered, 
FNMR gives zero for all device sets. (b) System capacity estimation: considering the 
deviation of each measurement from the specified identity, the total amount of deviations 
for multiple measurements is evaluated in the eigenspace. (c) The potential number of 
identities is estimated by dividing the volume of the total eigenspace by the volume of the 
individual devices to tolerate the measurement stability.  
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